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Unfortunately the VC10's career was not without its darker days. Two crashes claimed lives and several other airframes fell victim to terrorism, fortunately without loss of life. Other incidents that have occurred during the VC10's career are also included here to illustrate the fact that the VC10 also saved lives because of its well thought-out safety features and sound structure. 9G-ABP Beirut 28 December 1968
9G-ABP Beirut 28 December 1968
9G-ABP in Ghana Airways colors
Remarks: Information from Aviation Safety Net
Remarks: Information from Aviation Safety Net The Long Story With thanks to Mark Hubbard who included the text in electronic form in his Nigeria Airways VC10 package for Microsoft Flight Simulator 98, which can be downloaded here. Epilogue "As a recent graduate going out to join an oil exploration team in Nigeria, we (three new graduates, working for the same company) were booked on Nigeria Airways to Lagos on 19 November 1969. When we arrived in London our company representative advised us that there was a delay in processing the visa by the Nigerian High Commission. Because of this we missed the flight, and stayed overnight near London. The following morning we were told of the crash at Lagos. We were all in something of a state of shock at the time! I travelled to Lagos on the BOAC flight on the 20th, presenting my tickets for the previous day's flight much to the consternation of the BOAC check-in staff." G-ASGN 'Dawsons Field' Jordan 12 September 1970
The end of G-ASGN
after being blown up by terrorists
Remarks: Information from Aviation Safety Net G-ARTA London Gatwick 28 January 1972
Remarks: Information from Aviation Safety Net 5X-UVA Addis Ababa 18 April 1972
5X-UVA seen at Paris Orly Airport on 7 June 1969
Remarks: Information from Aviation Safety Net G-ASGO Amsterdam Schiphol 3 March 1974
Remarks: For more about this remaining piece of fuselage (including photos) have a look at the 'Bits & Pieces' page. Information from Aviation Safety Net Mr. Tony Johnson e-mailed me and provided some information relating to this incident: "Your article on the fate of G-ASGO at AMS prompted me to check my logbook – I was third pilot on G-ARVH, having been called from standby, on 4 Mar 1974 and operated to AMS to collect the passengers from 'GO. As we taxied in we saw 'GO being towed on a parallel taxiway – a very sorry sight. During passenger boarding the flight engineer (Phil Newman) saw the passenger baggage being loaded and came onto the flight deck with great concern. The Captain (Dave “Dinger” Bell) and I went to investigate and found that each passenger bag had been placed in a large clear plastic bag along with many litres of water that had entered the baggage when the Schiphol fire services extinguished the fire on 'GO. This presented the problem of unexpected additional weight of the water. It was impractical to empty each plastic bag (it would have taken too long) so the loadsheet was altered to account for the estimated amount of water on board. The return flight to LHR was uneventful." As the incident happened not too far from where I live I went and looked up some information in the local newspaper archives. From these articles I've pieced together the following story. The 3rd March 1974 would be a date to be remembered in the aviation world. Not because of the DC-7 Freighter that upon landing at London Luton couldn’t get its props in the reverse range and which burst all its main gear tires trying to slow down on the emergency brakes. It ended up overrunning the runway, fortunately with only the aircraft achieving damage. The Turkish DC-10 that taxied out from Paris-Orly at 12:24 bound for London would not be so fortunate. 10 minutes after taking off one of the cargo doors burst open, causing rapid decompression and part of the floor to collapse. With the control cables and lines through this floor severed the airplane went out of control and crashed 37 km NE of Paris. The airplane carried 335 passengers, many booked on this flight because of a British Airways strike, and 11 crew members, all perished. At the time this was the largest air disaster ever and what made it even more poignant was that a previous accident with another DC-10 had highlighted all the same risks which were at the source of this crash. Later that afternoon flight BA775 takes off from Beirut on the last leg of a flight from Bombay via Bahrain and Beirut to London. On board are approximately 90 passengers, 10 crew members and 2 hijackers. One and a half hour after take-off a businessman in the front of the plane observes two men walking towards the cockpit, one of them returning a few minutes later with the captain to announce that the plane has been hijacked. All the passengers are then relocated to the back of the aircraft and there they are to remain for the rest of the flight, during the next three hours observing one of the hijackers placing what appears to be explosives around the aircraft, focusing on the doors and the luggage bins. The crew consists of Captain Colin Harrison, Co-pilot Geoffrey Crawford and a third pilot, they continue to steer the aircraft towards the UK as the flight progresses. The hijackers are two young men (23 and 21 years old) who call themselves Abu Ali and Abu Said but their real names are different. They had met in a Palestinian refugee camp in January 1974 and were given some military training there. After an illegal border crossing to Syria they spent five days in a camp near Damascus learning topographic facts about Europe but also studying photos of the cabin of a BA VC10. From there they were sent to a camp near Beirut and on 3rd March they reported to an unknown man at the Beirut airport and were told that they were going to hijack the BA VC10, receiving tickets and weapons and being escorted through customs. At 17:13 (GMT+1) the aircraft contacts the Schiphol air traffic controller who receives the message that the aircraft has been hijacked in retaliation for the UK's aid to the 1973 Yom-Kippur war. This message is also picked up by a radio amateur in Hilversum (40km East of the airfield) who quickly notifies the police. Schiphol is told that the aircraft is low on fuel and although the ATC is not very enthusiastic about the plane landing there they clear the aircraft to land on runway 19R. At 17:30 with the hijacked VC10 North of the airfield Schiphol airfield is closed for all traffic, causing other flights to enter holding patterns or divert to Rotterdam. The aircraft lands on the assigned runway at 18:06 and after that there is no more communication between the aircraft and the tower. Inside the aircraft the hijackers collect all the passports from the passengers, tell them to take off their shoes and line up in the aisle of the aircraft. Shortly afterwards the doors open, the slides are extended and the passengers and crew leave the airplane. Just after the last person is out of the VC10 the hijackers grab bottles of whisky and set fire to the aircraft before leaving themselves. With smoke emerging from the aircraft the fire department kicks into gear but can only fight the fire from the outside as they know that there may be bombs on board. The two small explosions which are heard only serve to acknowledge this. Once the fire in the fuselage is somewhat under control a Flight Engineer (who had volunteered for this task) steps inside the airplane and shuts off the engines which were still running. The passengers are quick to point out the two hijackers to the police, being in the middle of an airfield they didn't have many places to go to anyway, and they are quickly arrested. In the meantime the airport is still sealed off for all traffic but even without this it would still be impossible to get there as all the roads around the field are gridlocked with many curious onlookers who flock to the scene of the incident on this Sunday evening. It takes hours to get all the traffic moving again, even though all they can see is some lights and vehicles far away on the runway. The aftermath of this event is less spectacular than the day itself. In the end there were no explosives found on board, the explosions that were heard were caused by two fire extinguishers bursting. Most of the passengers traveled on to London on Standard VC10 G-ARVH the next day and after a long day of emptying the cabin of G-ASGO the fire department, working with explosives experts, announced the aircraft safe. After spending some time parked on the east side of the airfield the airframe was broken up, repairs being too costly, with the small fuselage panel ending up with the then Aviodome museum. I've been unable to find out the fate of the hijackers but apparently they were the first to be tried for the crime of hijacking in The Netherlands. There is a memorial to the victims of the Paris DC-10 disaster in the woods of Ermenonville, 37 km NE of Paris.
XR806 Brize Norton 18 December 1997
Remarks: Information from Aviation Safety Net I received this comment from
Mike
Howles: The demise of XR806 is also the subject of an e-mail from another visitor: The aircraft had a problem with the fin tank indicator on the Flight Engineer's panel and it continually showed 0. The engineer tasked to defuel the aircraft, an odious task, elected to perform this from the Flight Engineers panel. He removed all the fuel from the wing tanks, the fin tank showing empty was ignored. She also had wing refueling pods fitted which move the center of gravity rearward and no counter weights in the cabin to counter it, as a result she gently sat on her tail." As it turns out not all of XR806 was scrapped in 1999 because the forward fuselage is still in use for battle damage repair training. For more details have a look at this page: During a flight across the Andes from Chile to Argentina G-ASIX got caught in a patch of clear air turbulence above the mountain peaks. The aircraft was thrown up on to its side at a 90-degree-plus back angle ant then tossed, headlong, nose down towards the peaks a few thousand feet below. (The mountains reaching up to 27,000 feet placed them close at hand.) The severity of the upset caused the PCUs (power control units) on almost every flying control surface to be knocked out of action leaving the crew with an airplane plummeting downwards at speeds approaching Mach 1. With very little control authority the crew managed a recovery, resetting the other PCUs along the way. The airplane landed safely at its destination and after a thorough ground check was despatched on its next flight back home to Gatwick. Only there did detailed engineering inspection reveal a fracture in one of the tail-fin support spars, which required a lengthy repair. The incident proved the strength of the VC10 airframe as other aircraft in similar situations have lost structural integrity and crashed. On an airliner with wing mounted engines the engine mounting pins would probably have snapped as the aircraft was spun around. G-ASGL Fuel starvation incident 1974
While on a night flight over the South China Sea G-ASGL suffered a fuel transfer error that caused all four engines to run down. In order to correct an imbalance the Flight Engineer had all four engines feeding from one main tank, but forgot about the situation. Later on when he was briefly away from his station the main tank ran dry, creating an eerie silence on the flightdeck as the four engines suddenly ran down. As this caused all the generators to drop off line, the ELRAT (electric ram air turbine) was quickly deployed, restoring electrical power to the flight controls. In the meantime a shaken Flight Engineer had returned to his post and started to restart the four engines, so that several minutes later all was back to normal except for the deployed ELRAT. As the ELRAT was designed for emergency use, the only way to re-stow it was on the ground, because of this the aircraft had to continue its flight with the ELRAT extended. The continued exposure during the rest of the flight caused the ELRAT to overspeed and fail sometime later in the flight. It was determined that the failure was due to 'whirl instability' which was later rectified by modifying the shaft structure of the device. And as was suitably demonstrated by this incident, there were good reasons why a VC10 was not allowed to fly without a functioning ELRAT, therefore the unit had to be replaced or repaired before G-ASGL could be returned to service. This story was e-mailed to me by Richard Hobby. If anyone else remembers these incidents please let me know. It is quite rare for an airliner to lose several engines at once, probably the only thing that can cause something like this is a fuel problem, but why should three engines quit and one keep on running? This story does give an indication of the amount of excess power available on a VC10, I guess it is safe to say that many an airplane would not survive a three engine flame-out! "A friend was returning from Niarobi in 1974 on a VC10. Not sure if it was EAA or BA. The aircraft lost power on three engines once airborne on take off and struggled around for an emergency landing. Of course panic struck most of the passengers who 'screamed the whole way round'. The flight was completed the next day, and he was late returning to school. I mentioned this to a retired BOAC VC10 pilot I met in Canada in the late 1990's and he said he had the same difficulty on take off from Calcutta. BOAC and Vickers engineers expressed doubt that the plane could have been saved under such circumstances. The design parameters suggested it should have been impossible to recover from this condition with a fully loaded aircraft under hot conditions." In January 2007 retired VC10 Flight Engineer N. Boulton e-mailed me about this story: "Regarding the supposed single engine flight of a VC10 at Nairobi, my experience would suggest that this would not be possible. I remember departing from Nairobi for Europe (11 Jan 1968, G-ARVK). A tyre tread on the port main undercarriage came off on take off. (The tyres were 220 MPH/ 204 knots limited ground speed.) This caused a hole in the flaps and debris was ingested into #2 engine causing damage to the engine compressor blades, which became unbalanced. The flight engineer's VME (engine Vibration Measuring Equipment) detected the vibration on #2 engine and once we had achieved a safe altitude of 20,000 feet (there is high ground on track , northbound out of Nairobi Airport-NBO) Captain (Jumbo) Jarvis ordered the #2 engine shut down. We dumped fuel down to maximum landing weight and returned to Nairobi. Prior to selection of full landing flap I was very much aware that we had 97% power on the 3 remaining engines whilst on the ILS at the outer marker. This was in excess of max continuous power which was around 94.5 % (as I remember). (Max Take off power was 100% N1, 100% N2 and 600 degrees EGT.) On the ground, the fuel cross feed manifold in the wheel well was also found to be damaged and leaking fuel. In my opinion we would not have been able to make it on one engine. We might
possibly have made it on 2 engines if we had dumped down to the stack pipes and
restricted the flap settings. The touchdown speed would have been very high.
That sort of thing would have been rather hairy!" A stack of old 'Flight' magazines containing VC10 related articles was kindly donated to me by John Downey, and in the 4 December 1969 issue was this article describing a flight which had to return to Heathrow due to an uncontained engine failure.
BOAC Super VC10 G-ASGK suffered a major mechanical failure on November 27 which resulted in low-pressure turbine blades being shed from number three (starboard-inner) Conway. The aircraft was at about 6,500ft over Reading at about 1115hr when a loud bang was heard in the aircraft and on the ground. Debris from number three engine apparently penetrated number four, causing it to catch fire. The fire-warning light of this engine came on, followed by indications that number three was running down. The fire was quickly extinguished by the automatic system. Resulting from the failure, the l.p. turbine and thrust reverser assemblies separated from the aircraft, but caused no damage on hitting the ground. The Super VC10 returned to Heathrow and landed at 170kt at a weight of about 327,000lb - some 90,000lb over the design limit landing weight. The aircraft had a full fuel load for the London to New York sector, and there was insufficient time to jettison any of it. The undercarriage was lowered manually. Two tires deflated on landing - the fusible plugs blew - but there were no injuries among the 58 passengers and 11 crew. The VC10 had flown 6,527hr in service and number three engine was fitted on July 1. The two engines are being removed and will go to the BOAC overhaul centre at Treforest for inspection. British airworthiness requirements stipulate that any single
failed compressor or turbine blade must be contained within the engine casing.
Multiple blade failures or turbine-disc disintegrations are not required to be
contained. The probability of such failures is considered remote and the weight
penalty of catering for them unacceptable. Approach incident at Washington During a VIP flight to Washington a RAF VC10 got into a situation where unusual weather created a near-accident situation; had it not been for the VC10's superior performance characteristics, an accident would most certainly have ensued. This incident is part of a larger account which can be found in the 'Memories' section by clicking on this link: Fun and Games with Harold. G-ARVB ice encounter - 2 February 1968
While flying over the Persian Gulf on its way to the UK, Standard VC10 G-ARVB ran into a violent storm between 5000 and 10000 feet which contained hailstones of very large size. The damage that was done to the airliner was severe, apart from dents in all the leading edges the radome covering the radar antenna of the aircraft separated from the fuselage, hitting the top of the tail. The resulting blunt front end of the aircraft created strange airflows around the nose section, rendering the pitot tubes which are mounted just behind the cockpit on the fuselage sides completely useless. Normally the airflow into these tubes provides the airspeed information, but in this case the airspeed indicators were useless. Obviously Captain C. Ditmas radioed for assistance. To get the airliner down safely a 208 Sqn. Hunter from Muharraq was scrambled to escort the BOAC aircraft. Piloted by Flt. Lt. Ray Taylor it flew alongside the airliner, providing airspeed information over the radio, and thus enabling the VC10 to make a safe landing at Bahrain. It wasn't the end of the excitement for that day though, as the Hunter suffered a full hydraulic failure, after a second full emergency call-out the Hunter landed safely as well. Here is what some publications had to say about the incident: National newspaper: "Aircraft Damaged By “Tennis-Ball” Hailstones. A V.C.10 airliner arrived safely
yesterday after being hammered by hailstones the size of cricket balls while it
was taking off from Bahrein Airport. RAF News, 24th February 1968: "Hunter in VC 10 Gulf drama In a drama over the Persian Gulf a
Hunter took over the guidance of a BOAC VC 10 to safely land its passengers in
Bahrain. And the last word is for this unknown (but probably local RAF-) publication: "And by the way, let’s not forget the RAF Hunter pilot of 208 Squadron, Flight Lieutenant Ray Tyler, down there in Bahrain, who having nobly sprung to the help of Chris and his blokes, and seen them safely down on the ground, promptly found himself right up to the ears in the John Innes No. 1 when he lost all his hydraulics, including his TPI. We’ve heard that a Hunter’s practically unflyable without its TPI, but this boyo managed to get back in. We only hope that somebody saw to it that he was liberally dowsed in John Thuillier champagne." (TPI = Tail Plane Incidence or tail trim) Actually that wasn't the last word about this incident, as ex-VC10 Flight Engineer N. Boulton contacted me with his memories of this incident. So read on! "I had operated the Bahrain-Delhi-Bahrain shuttle with G-ARVB (Captain Whittaker) and handed over the aircraft to Captain Chris Ditmus in Bahrain. Our crew were back in the Bahrain BOAC Resthouse having a beer (There were no hotels in Bahrain at that time - The Gulf Hotel was unfinished), when we got a phone call for the Captain and E/O to return to the airport with our aircraft manuals in order to assist the crew if required. In the event 'VB was on the deck when we got there. The radio conversations between the RAF Hunter and 'VB had to be relayed via the Control Tower because the Hunter used UHF and the VC10 VHF and could not communicate directly with each other. The Hunter had lost his hydraulics and had to land with a jammed stabiliser - More drama! When we all got back to the bar Chris Ditmus remarked that with all the vibration and noise "That it was like driving a Glasgow tram car at 300 Miles per hour!" On all the photographs of the VC10 flight deck that one sees these days, there appears to be a complete lack of the Doppler Navigation Aid that was positioned forward of the throttles on the pilot's centre instrument panel. As far as I remember we used to set up the track and distance for each leg and at 10 miles to go a light (green?) use to come on. As we passed over the fix, the system would automatically change over to the next navigational leg. It was pretty accurate for the 1960s - perhaps 6 miles out when you got to New York from London Heathrow. As I recollect the Doppler also had a read out for speed over the ground. This was important to the crew of 'VB because with no airspeed indications due to the missing radome and severe turbulence over the pitot probes the Captain could use his Doppler speed (bearing in mind wind speed + a few knots for 'Mum'!) together with aircraft attitude as a guide to his airspeed. As far as I remember the Doppler System originated from the RAF - probably V-Bombers where it was called Green something-or-other." With thanks to R. Lee and D. Gardner for supplying the photos and material for this story, also N. Boulton for his additions. VC10 incident - Navigation error over the North Atlantic An old issue of 'Air Clues' recently unearthed a story of a VC10 that got itself off track. Originally published in July 1969 here it is again.
The VC10 pounds powerfully through the inky darkness of the early morning. From 30,000 ft the roar of its engines is heard only distantly by those afloat on the unfriendly seas of the North Atlantic. Perhaps a few pause in their vigil to gaze aloft and marvel at the speed and ease of air travel in comparison with the rough and tumble of the ocean in winter. Others perhaps pause to reflect on the skill of those who navigate so unerringly through the night skies, following so closely the curving track that forms the shortest distance from the old world to the new. Aboard the speeding aeroplane, the passengers are for the most part sleeping peacefully in the pre-dawn blackness. The cabin is gloomy. Further forward the crew sit shrouded in the eerie glow of the instrument lighting. A sense of timelessness persists, and the scene, one imagines, resembles that in a spaceship bound for a distant planet. This apparent tranquillity and the steady hum of the equipment belie the unceasing routine activity that keeps the ship upon its course. The navigator takes an astro-fix. As he does so he is interrupted by the captain who says that a return has appeared on the cloud radar—it looks like a coastline. But how can it be, out here in mid-Atlantic? The crew discuss the possibilities. It must be a large amount of ice—but it is surely a long way south? The astro-fix shows that the aircraft is not on track. The navigator ponders; his 8000 hrs experience telling him that this suspicion growing in his mind cannot be true. The last astro-fix cannot possibly be true—probably something went wrong when the pilot interrupted him. Still, better just check with the Prince Christian beacon on the southern tip of Greenland. Tune it, check the coding. GREAT BALLS OF FIRE! It must be true! The radar return is the coast of GREENLAND!!!!
Early one Saturday evening last autumn the VC10 had landed at an RAF station in the Midlands from where it was scheduled to transport personnel across the North Atlantic the following morning. After landing, the crew checked in with Ops and Met before taking a meal at the Aircrew Buffet, after which the pilot, co-pilot and navigator went to their Mess, changed and went into the bar. The crew left the bar early because they had to make an early start next day but the navigator had some difficulty in getting off to sleep because a 'beat group' was making a loud noise in another Mess nearby. Eventually he dropped off and his next recollection was of being woken at 4 o'clock the next morning. At 0430 the crew were driven to the Flight Planning Section, and the navigator remained there while the rest of the crew went to breakfast; the navigator took his meal later. About this time the captain heard the navigator say that he felt tired owing to the beat-group preventing him from getting off to sleep. At Flight Planning, the navigator found that the North Atlantic Planned Tracks for the day were not available, but the Minimum Time Track was available so he decided to use that. He also decided to use the Gyro/Grid Technique of Navigation, not being aware that it was not command policy to practice Gyro/Grid steering over the North Atlantic except when two navigators were operating together, with one of them holding an A or B category. He was unable to finish all his planning and told the captain that he would calculate the Point of No Return and some other items after getting airborne. The VC10 took to the air at 0710 and, with the co-pilot flying it, followed airways to Tory Island off the north-west coast of Ireland. The aircraft had been cleared to fly at FL310 after requesting Flight Plan clearance at FL350. Having previously extracted the value of Earth Rate from the tables and added the Residual Transport Wander, the navigator had set the product. -11.8°/hr, on the Rate Corrector of the starboard compass system, and switched over to GYRO. But the correct figure that should have been set on the Rate Corrector was +11.8°/ hr. This simple error had the effect of precessing the gyro at the rate of nearly 24° per hour causing the aircraft to diverge slowly north of its intended track. What was happening aboard the aircraft that led to this error not being noticed? The Captain's knowledge of Gyro/Grid navigation was scanty and when he carried out a cross-check of the E2B, Magnetic and Gyro compasses, their relationship appeared satisfactory to him. Because the navigator's first astro-fix gave a plot close to the intended track and the Howgozit showed that fuel consumption was close to that planned, the Captain had little reason to suppose that the flight, so far carried out entirely in darkness, was anything other than normal—until some time before he was due to give a position report at 40°W he saw a 40-mile wide return on the cloud radar, about 100 nm ahead. It was during the second astro-fix that the navigator's attention was drawn to the captain's sighting on the radar. After some discussion the crew decided that the object could only be a large amount of ice. Indeed it was a large amount of ice, but it was ice attached to the coast of Greenland—for by now the VC10 was approaching a point some 510 nm north of its intended track! But at last the penny was beginning to drop in the navigator's mind. The result of the astro-fix, which to him seemed hopelessly wrong, coupled with the radar-return caused him to try tuning some NDBs. A bearing from the Prince Christian beacon at the southern tip of Greenland confirmed his worst fears and he told the captain the bad news. The captain took the controls and command of the situation. The aircraft was later fixed overhead the Prince Christian beacon and eventually landed safely at Gander with rather less fuel than intended. Wing Commander Spry says: I hope the pilot and the navigator of the VC10 will forgive me for reviving this ghastly episode which I can well understand they are anxious to forget. But I consider that this story should be published as a warning, and in the hope that its appearance may prevent others from falling into a similar trap. For is it not one of those "there, but for the Grace of God, go I" stories? This navigator had a total experience of getting on for 8000 hrs. Yet when his log and chart of this trip were examined afterwards by a highly-qualified examiner, an appalling number of errors, omissions and deficiencies were brought to light, not the least being the fact that his astro-fixing was woefully inaccurate. I could say a great deal about this particular story, a very great deal, but I think that it speaks for itself. Read it again and remember that no matter how good or how sophisticated the aeroplane and the navigation equipment it carries may be—the safety of the aircraft still relies upon the skill and fitness of those who operate that equipment. |
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