vololiberista wrote:I sometimes wonder how in some cases pilots seem to totally ignore a stall warning. And in the case of G-ARPI they turned the stick pusher off
At the time of 'PI's' accident the stick push on the Trident had a reputation for spurious operation.
vololiberista wrote:I sometimes wonder how in some cases pilots seem to totally ignore a stall warning. And in the case of G-ARPI they turned the stick pusher off
At the time of 'PI's' accident the stick push on the Trident had a reputation for spurious operation.
Paul
Are you sure? My understanding is and I think the accident report also reflects that is that the stick pusher and shaker mechanism was not trusted by some pilots because of it being a relatively new innovation not because it was unreliable.
"We heard some criticism of the reliability of the stall warning and recovery systems and, what is by no means the same thing, suggestions that pilots as a whole regarded the the two systems as unreliable, and were apt to regard their operation as more likely to be spurious.
Accordingly we examined in some details the history of the systems as experienced by BEA. It should be noted that reports on stick-shaker function will all or nearly all be occasions where the captain regarded the operation as being spurious. Whether he was right or whether the operation was in fact genuine is not always easy to determine. For example, two pilots who gave evidence realised for the first time as they recounted their particular experiences to us that the stall warning was probably genuine."
"We heard some criticism of the reliability of the stall warning and recovery systems and, what is by no means the same thing, suggestions that pilots as a whole regarded the the two systems as unreliable, and were apt to regard their operation as more likely to be spurious.
Accordingly we examined in some details the history of the systems as experienced by BEA. It should be noted that reports on stick-shaker function will all or nearly all be occasions where the captain regarded the operation as being spurious. Whether he was right or whether the operation was in fact genuine is not always easy to determine. For example, two pilots who gave evidence realised for the first time as they recounted their particular experiences to us that the stall warning was probably genuine."
There you go! something new not trusted. It was this accident that forced the CAA to introduce cockpit recorders. I well remember the fuss that pilots made about that too!
"We heard some criticism of the reliability of the stall warning and recovery systems and, what is by no means the same thing, suggestions that pilots as a whole regarded the the two systems as unreliable, and were apt to regard their operation as more likely to be spurious.
Accordingly we examined in some details the history of the systems as experienced by BEA. It should be noted that reports on stick-shaker function will all or nearly all be occasions where the captain regarded the operation as being spurious. Whether he was right or whether the operation was in fact genuine is not always easy to determine. For example, two pilots who gave evidence realised for the first time as they recounted their particular experiences to us that the stall warning was probably genuine."
There you go! something new not trusted. It was this accident that forced the CAA to introduce cockpit recorders. I well remember the fuss that pilots made about that too!
We'll have to disagree on the interpretation of that extract
