I was perusing the memories page last night and a couple of points came to mind.
1. Memories of a neighbour.
Dickie Brown, the guy who experienced a Conway at close quarters - I believe he is one of the guardians at Brooklands, I was talking to him a couple of years ago while we stood on G-ASIX.
2.Chinese Seaman Incident.
I do not understand why the Nev Boulton would have been unable to check if the landing gear was locked down if it was dark. Unless the BOAC a/c were different there were mechanical MLG downlock indicators in the Cabin above the hatrack at fuselage station 994
VC10 Memories Section
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Laurieg
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He should have known from the light sequencing when the gear was selected down, as well. If the door light came on, followed by disagreements then went out again the gear must be in the down lock, (door sequencing valve operating).
Never had a GE's wallet. It was always empty when I got back but I always had a smile on my face 
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Jelle Hieminga
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In a way I can understand the apprehension about the situation. With a known gear door problem there might be other damage to the gear leg, possibly interfering with the gear indications.
The mechanical indicators are installed on the type 1154s, that I know as I've got a manual that says so. The BOAC aircraft may have been different of course but still I would guess that a backup gear indication would have been included from day 1. Is there anyone who knows if the K2s had them?
The mechanical indicators are installed on the type 1154s, that I know as I've got a manual that says so. The BOAC aircraft may have been different of course but still I would guess that a backup gear indication would have been included from day 1. Is there anyone who knows if the K2s had them?
Buttons . . . check. Dials . . . check. Switches . . . check. Little
colored lights . . . check.
colored lights . . . check.
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Laurieg
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I can see that, Jelle. I was thinking from the eng point of view but I know, in the past on route, when this has happened, (probably due to icing of the microswitch assembly), this has not been the follow-up action carried out.
As for the K2, they were on their way out when I joined the squadron and my notes have gone astray. Poor old girls!
As for the K2, they were on their way out when I joined the squadron and my notes have gone astray. Poor old girls!
Never had a GE's wallet. It was always empty when I got back but I always had a smile on my face 
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Jelle Hieminga
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I figured they would be installed. I've asked Mr. Boulton if he'd like to join in the discussion as he can provide the first-hand knowledge. I see that he has registered on the forum so we might hear from him.
Buttons . . . check. Dials . . . check. Switches . . . check. Little
colored lights . . . check.
colored lights . . . check.
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RN Boulton
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Ref The Chinese Seaman Incident.
I see that a couple of queries have been raised concerning the confirmation of the landing gear position and the crew actions.
I think that after all this time (at 75 years old) that I would certainly fail a VC10 check ride!
Bear in mind that it is around 30 years ago and I have had to learn two other aircraft and various engines since....
(ANZ DC10/30/GE and the Boeing 747/100/200/combi/Q/Frieghter/RR & P&W
Obviously the crew looked at all the emergency undercarriage procedures prior to landing at LHR. Yes, we clearly understood the importance of monitoring the light sequences of the doors and gear lights. Yes, we knew about the mechanical indicators and the throttle warning horn too. By the time that we got to LHR we had completely revised everything about the gear and done a 'What If' as well.
The point that I was making was that the F7 periscope had a very limited use and was no good for checking the down locks - The outboard door which was operated by the strut from the oleo leg did not have any indicator to tell the crew in which position it was. The fact that we carried out a non-standard procedure, kept the engines running after landing and had hydraulic pressure and then got the ground locks inserted prior to leaving the runway illustrates that the operation had been completely thought through. Better to be ultra safe than sorry.
Nev Boulton
I see that a couple of queries have been raised concerning the confirmation of the landing gear position and the crew actions.
I think that after all this time (at 75 years old) that I would certainly fail a VC10 check ride!
Bear in mind that it is around 30 years ago and I have had to learn two other aircraft and various engines since....
(ANZ DC10/30/GE and the Boeing 747/100/200/combi/Q/Frieghter/RR & P&W
Obviously the crew looked at all the emergency undercarriage procedures prior to landing at LHR. Yes, we clearly understood the importance of monitoring the light sequences of the doors and gear lights. Yes, we knew about the mechanical indicators and the throttle warning horn too. By the time that we got to LHR we had completely revised everything about the gear and done a 'What If' as well.
The point that I was making was that the F7 periscope had a very limited use and was no good for checking the down locks - The outboard door which was operated by the strut from the oleo leg did not have any indicator to tell the crew in which position it was. The fact that we carried out a non-standard procedure, kept the engines running after landing and had hydraulic pressure and then got the ground locks inserted prior to leaving the runway illustrates that the operation had been completely thought through. Better to be ultra safe than sorry.
Nev Boulton